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INTRODUCTION
"The problem of the burka is not a religious problem, it's a problem of
liberty and women's dignity. It's not a religious symbol, but a sign of
subservience and debasement. I want to say solemnly, the burka is not
welcome in France. In our country we cannot accept women prisoners
behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That's
not our idea of freedom."
Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic of Francel
"Assuming that all women who wear the burka or the niqab are wearing it
under duress, it doesn't follow that men, like the French President Nicolas
Sarkozy, ought to command a woman not to wear it."
Zehra Rizavi, writer 2
"This is what I want to do to get closer to Allah. I'm not harming anyone.
I won't take it (my niqab) off. It's very important to me. I won't take it
off."
- Aminah Delgado, niqab wearer3
The September 2010 French ban on burqas4 and niqabs in public
places ignited an international debate about balancing Western ideals
1. Nicolas Sarkozy, quoted in Angelique Chrisafis, Nicolas Sarkozy Says
Islamic Veils are Not Welcome in France, GUARDIAN (Paris), June 22, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/22islamic-veils-sarkozy-speech-france.
2. Zehra Rizavi, quoted in Melissa Bell, Niqabs and Hot Pants: French
Women Protest the Burqa Ban, WASH. POST. BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010, 12:27 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/blog-
post/2010/10/niqaband hotpants french wom.html.
3. Aminah Delgado, quoted in Selma Chalabi, 'Apprehension'Among Muslim
Women, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/uk news/wales/8564109.stm.
4. See In Graphics: Muslim Veils, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/shared/spl/hi/popups/05/europe muslim veils/html/2.stm (follow "NEXT"
hyperlink to see page two) (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (describing the burqa as a veil
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of secularism and gender equality with traditional Muslim practices;
a debate fueled by the rising number of Muslims in the Western
world.6 The French government justifies the ban by claiming it
promotes gender equality, protects national security, and preserves
the French ideals of maintaining a secular society and promoting a
unified French culture.' Opponents of the ban reject these
justifications, instead claiming the ban violates several human rights
and is only meant to further marginalize the Muslim population in
France.
Only about 2,000 women in France are believed to wear a burqa or
niqab.9 Many in the French Muslim community, however, are
apprehensive about the possibility that the ban will lead to an
increase in discrimination of Muslims in France.' 0 Furthermore,
many are concerned that instead of granting these women greater
freedoms, the ban will instead force them to withdraw from public
life and remain in the home."' In addition to arguments in opposition
that "covers the entire face and body" and includes a mesh screen that covers the
eyes).
5. See id. (describing the niqab as a veil that covers the face, but leaves an
opening for the eyes).
6. See David Gauthier-Villars & Charles Forelle, French Parliament Passes
LawBanningBurqas,WALLST.J.,Sept. 15,2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703376504575492011925494780
.html (finding that many European countries including France are exploring ways
to reconcile the "values of modem Europe with more assertive expressions of
Islamic faith," but noting that a ban might not be compatible with human rights
commitments).
7. See discussion infra Part III.A (arguing that France's justifications for the
burqa ban correspond with its understanding of the right to take part in cultural life
prior to the issuance of General Coiment No. 21).
8. See discussion infra Part II.C (articulating that despite some international
support for the ban, there is widespread opposition by individuals, states, and
international organizations).
9. See Thierry Leveque, French Woman on Trial for "Burqa Assault",
REUTERS, Oct. 14, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE69D57620101014 (noting that the approximate number of women
in France that wear a full face veil is marginal compared with France's Muslim
community of five million-Western Europe's largest).
10. See, e.g., id (discussing an incident where a French woman ripped off the
full face veil of an Emirati tourist and then assaulted the tourist when the tourist
put the face veil back on).
11. See Gauthier-Villars & Forelle, supra note 6 (reporting that some Muslim
women living in France do not go out in public with their faces uncovered, but
instead get friends to run errands for them while they stay hidden at home).
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to the ban and concerns of the French Muslim population, General
Comment No. 21, issued by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ("CESCR") in December 2009,12 illustrates that the
burqa ban is a violation of the right to take part in cultural life," a
right that France is obligated to uphold as a state party to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR").14
This Comment analyzes the significance of General Comment No.
21 in protecting the right "to take part in cultural life," granted in
Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR.11 The CESCR issued General
Comment No. 21 to clearly define the parameters of this right, so
states parties would be better equipped to effectively protect their
citizens' right to take part in cultural life.'6 This Comment argues
that General Comment No. 21 is successful because it clarifies the
definition and scope of the right to take part in cultural life, imposes
stricter obligations upon states parties, and limits the opportunities
for states parties to legally restrict this right. Additionally, this
Comment illustrates the significance of General Comment No. 21 by
demonstrating that if not for the guidance offered in General
Comment No. 21, France's ban on burqas could be considered
compliant with France's obligations under the ICESCR. 17 Through
12. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, Dec. 21, 2009 [hereinafter General Comment No. 21].
13. See discussion infra Part III.B (arguing that General Comment No. 21
indicates that the French burqa ban is inconsistent with France's obligations under
the ICESCR); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 15(1)(a), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (granting
everyone the right "to take part in cultural life").
14. See Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,U.N.TREATYCOLLECTION,http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src
=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-3&chapter-4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 22, 2011)
[hereinafter ICESCR Status] (identifying France as a party to the ICESCR since
Nov. 4, 1980).
15. ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 15(1)(a).
16. See discussion infra Part II.A (describing the ambiguity surrounding the
right to take part in cultural life that necessitated the issuance of General Comment
No. 21 for clarification purposes).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A (suggesting that France could argue the burqa
ban protects the right of oppressed women to take part in the cultural life of French




its elaboration on the meaning and scope of the right to take part in
cultural life, however, the CESCR clearly establishes that the burqa
ban is a violation of this right. "
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the right to take
part in cultural life as granted by Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR and
discusses the background of General Comment No. 21.19 Part I then
addresses the French interpretation of the right to take part in cultural
life and examines France's ban on burqas and niqabs.20 Part
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the ICESCR and the right
to take part in cultural life, as well as the effectiveness of General
Comment No. 21 by examining the legality of the French ban on
burqas both before and after its issuance.2 1
Part III recommends that the CESCR encourage states to ratify the
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR to foster further development of
the rights protected by the ICESCR through case law.2 2 Additionally,
Part III recommends that the CESCR amend General Comment No.
21 to add language that additionally clarifies how the right to take
part in cultural life should be protected when a cultural practice
infringes upon other human rights. 23 Lastly, Part III recommends that
the CESCR strengthen the rights granted in the ICESCR by adding
language to General Comment No. 21 that imposes repercussions for
violations of these rights.24
18. See discussion infra Part II.B (demonstrating that the clarity provided by
General Comment No. 21 makes France unable to effectively argue the ban on
burqas is not a violation of the right to take part in cultural life).
19. See discussion infra Part L.A (discussing the vague nature of the right to
take part in cultural life, which necessitated the adoption of General Comment No.
21).
20. See discussion infra Part I.B-C (explaining that the French pursuit of a ban
on burqas is related to its narrow interpretation of the right to take part in cultural
life).
21. See discussion infra Part II.A-B (arguing that General Comment No. 21
effectively eliminated the confusion surrounding the right to take part in cultural
life and precludes France from claiming its burqa ban is not a violation of this
right).
22. See discussion infra Part III.A (indicating that the adoption of a complaints
mechanism would provide legitimacy and strength to the rights granted in the
ICESCR).
23. See discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting that a balancing test be used to
abate confusion over when limitations on the right to take part in cultural life are
considered either necessary or permissible).




Vague wording in the ICESCR created great uncertainty regarding
the meaning and scope of the right to take part in cultural life.
Moreover, the similar rights to culture granted in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")2 5 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")26  further
exacerbate this confusion because all three instruments state the right
differently.2 7 It is unclear whether the ICESCR's right to take part in
cultural life encompasses the more narrow rights granted in the
UDHR and ICCPR or whether it is its own, completely distinct right.
This uncertainty allowed states to interpret the right in the manner
that best suited their interests, often leading to a failure to protect the
right altogether. 28 As a result of this confusion, the creation of
General Comment No. 21 was necessary to provide clarity on the
meaning and scope of the right to take part in cultural life.
Prior to General Comment No. 21, France interpreted the right to
take part in cultural life as granting only a right to take part in the
cultural life of the state. 29 This interpretation allowed France to
encourage states to devote as many resources to protecting the right to take part in
cultural life as they devote to protecting other rights).
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, arts. 22,
27(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(1I1) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
27. See id. ("In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."); ICESCR,
supra note 13, art. 15(1)(a) ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life . . . "); UDHR, supra note 25,
art. 27 ("Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits."); see also discussion infra Part LA (suggesting that the subtle differences
in wording of the right to culture stated in each instrument left states confused
about what the ICESCR's right to take part in cultural life entails).
28. See YvONNE M. DONDERS, TowARDS A RIGHT TO CULTURAL IDENTITY?
149-50 (2002) (explaining that some countries, influenced by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, considered ICESCR Article 15
in a broader context without interpreting the concept of "cultural life"); see also
discussion infra Part II.A. 1 (stating that the lack of clarity surrounding the right to
take part in cultural life allowed France to form a self-interested, policy-oriented
interpretation of the right).
29. See Yael Barbibay, Note, Citizenship Privilege or the Right to Religious
2011] 1443
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refuse to recognize the rights of minorities to engage in their own
culture.3 0 Consequently, the French ban on burqas stems from
France's desire to promote a unified, singular French culture and to
reduce the presence of minority cultures within its territory."
A. THE RIGHT To TAKE PART IN CULTURAL LIFE
1. An Overview ofArticle 15(1)(a) and the Uncertainty Surrounding
its Meaning
In 1966 the United Nations ("U.N.") adopted two separate
covenants that when joined with the UDHR created the International
Bill of Rights." The ICESCR grants economic, social, and cultural
rights, while its twin, the ICCPR, grants civil and political rights.33
Though adopted together, the differences between the two covenants
Freedom: The Blackmailing of France's Islamic Women, 18 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 159, 160 (2010) (attributing France's idiosyncratic struggle to preserve
cultural uniqueness and revolutionary ideals to efforts to maintain the cultural life
of the state).
30. See Sarah Bienkowski, Note, Has France Taken Assimilation Too Far?
Muslim Beliefs, French National Values, and the June 27, 2008 Conseil D 'tat
Decision on MME M, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 437, 437 (2010) (crediting
France's long established assimilationist tradition for favoring "integration with its
national culture over any particularized group identities"); see also discussion infra
Part I.B (discussing France's interpretation of the right to take part in cultural life
as only applying to the cultural life of France itself).
31. See Bienkowski, supra note 30, at 439-40 (explaining the French
constitutional principle that "the public sphere should be strictly secular" and that
based on this idea, identities centering on individual characteristics are "associated
with subversion and disloyalty"); see also discussion infra Part I.C (chronicling the
history of France's focus on encouraging a single cultural identity within its
borders).
32. See ICCPR, supra note 26; ICESCR, supra note 13; Asbjorn Eide & Allan
Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 15, 15 (Asbjorn Eide,
Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas eds., 1995) (stating that the General Assembly
decided to divide the rights of the UDHR into two separate covenants, leading to
the development of two distinct categories of human rights).
33. See ICCPR, supra note 26; ICESCR, supra note 13; WILLIAM KURT
BARTH, ON CULTURAL RIGHTS: THE EQUALITY OF NATIONS AND THE MINORITY
LEGAL TRADITION 88-89 (2008) (noting the ideological split between East and
West was decided after a bitter debate between the Western allies who opposed the
inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights into a human rights covenant and




generated uncertainties in the international community about the
validity, scope, and enforceability of the rights granted by the
ICESCR, resulting in less respect for and adherence to these rights.3 4
The international community's response to the right of everyone to
take part in cultural life is particularly illustrative of the uncertainty
that surrounds the scope of the rights in the ICESCR." Due to the
broad language used in Article 15(1)(a), states could follow their
own interpretations of what the right to take part in cultural life
actually encompasses.3 Scholars believe, however, that the original
drafters of the right envisioned Article 15(l)(a) to provide all citizens
greater access to and participation in the cultural life of the state.37
The drafters considered "cultural life" to denote "high culture,"
meaning art, theater, museums, and other tangible elements of
culture.38
34. E.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], May 26, 2008, No. S
06 0105 F/2008, ILDC 1114 (Belg.) (declining to acknowledge that the ICESCR
directly affects Belgium because of the general nature of the obligation to
progressively realize its recognized rights); see MARY DOWELL-JONES,
CONTEXTUALISING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC DEFICIT 2 (2004) (suggesting that
states believed the rights in the ICCPR were immediately guaranteed and enforced,
while the rights in the ICESCR were subject to state discretion and incapable of
judicial enforcement); cf Christian Groni, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life,
submitted to U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, at 2, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/40/3 (May 9, 2008) (expressing surprise that cultural rights were neglected
by the international community, given the cultural focus of international law); Int'l
Comm'n of Jurists, Right to Take Part in Cultural Life (Article 15(1)(a) of the
Covenant), submitted to U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 1, 4 U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/40/7 (May 9, 2008) (remarking that economic, social, and especially
cultural rights were ignored when compared to civil and political rights).
35. See Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 34, T 4 (suggesting that due to
vagueness or lack of a definition of normative content, critics of economic, social,
and cultural rights often consider the right to take part in cultural life as a right that
lacks necessary clarity).
36. Cf Groni, supra note 34, at 23 (noting that states tend to interpret the scope
of "article 15.1 (a) in a very extensive way to cover [their own] needs, wishes or
political claims").
37. See DONDERS, supra note 28, at 150 (noting that the drafters' rejection of a
proposal to include language in Article 15(l)(a) acknowledging cultural
communities apart from the national culture demonstrated that the right was meant
to grant participation in only the national culture).
38. See id at 157 (characterizing three different concepts of culture: the classic
culture concept, culture as a plural form, and culture as the life of society, but
acknowledging that the drafters of the right to take part in cultural life focused on
2011] 1445
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In recent years, however, increases in immigration and
globalization contributed to more cultural diversity in states that are
parties to the ICESCR. 9 This diversity facilitated the emergence of a
modem interpretation of the right to take part in cultural life; one that
seeks to protect cultural diversity and includes within the concept of
"cultural life" intangible elements of culture, such as language,
customs, traditions, and land.4 0
2. The Differences in the Monitoring Bodies and in the Treatment of
Minorities and Minority Cultures in the ICESCR, ICCPR, and
UDHR
The confusion and complexity surrounding the right to take part in
cultural life is further exacerbated by the differences between the
right granted in the ICESCR and the similar rights to culture granted
in the UDHR and the ICCPR.4 1 While the right to take part in
cultural life is stated broadly in the ICESCR, the right to culture is
narrowly tailored in the UDHR and the ICCPR. 42 Article 27(1) of the
the classic culture concept, indicative of high culture).
39. See Elissavet Stamatopoulou, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life,
submitted to U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, at 9, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/40/9 (May 9, 2008) (arguing that as a result of the "unprecedented mass
movement of migrants and refugees around the globe," cultures were forced
together too quickly, making it difficult for societies to adjust without profound
ramifications); cf Barbibay, supra note 29, at 160 (noting significant changes to
the demographic and religious landscape created by the consistently growing
population of Islamic immigrants throughout European states).
40. Cf DONDERS, supra note 28, at 157 (suggesting that the concept of culture
has evolved and that in 1992 the CESCR debated considering culture "in its
anthropological form as a way of life"); Dominic McGoldrick, Culture, Cultures,
and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION
447, 449-52 (Mashood A. Baderin & Robert McCorquodale eds., 2007)
(discussing that the idea of a state or individual identifying with a single culture is
no longer valid and that a more realistic understanding of the contemporary world
acknowledges that states are made of multiple cultures and sub-cultures).
41. Cf BARTH, supra note 33, at 89 (noting that the ICESCR is weaker than the
ICCPR because it "requires progressive implementation and is not yet
internationally justiciable"); DONDERS, supra note 28, at 160 (finding that Article
15 of the ICESCR does not include language protecting the right to participate in
the cultural life of "the community" as does Article 27 of the UDHR, and that
Article 15 never received attention from states parties until the CESCR began to
expand upon its meaning).
42. Compare ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 15(l)(a) (stating generally the right
of everyone to take part in cultural life), with ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 27
(providing only the right of minorities to participate in their own culture), and
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UDHR grants a right to participate in only the culture of the
community, 43 while Article 27 of the ICCPR extends a right
specifically to minorities to practice their own culture."
The Human Rights Committee ("HRC"), the monitoring body for
the ICCPR, possesses the power to hear complaints regarding alleged
violations of enumerated ICCPR rights.45 Alternatively, the CESCR,
the monitoring body for the ICESCR, does not possess the power to
hear individual complaints and instead can only review state reports
and issue recommendations. 46 However, the CESCR drafted an
Optional Protocol that will give the CESCR the same power as the
HRC to hear claims from individuals based on violations of their
ICESCR rights.47 Currently, only three states have ratified the
UDHR, supra note 25, art. 27(1) (granting everyone the right only to participate in
the culture of the community). See Groni, supra note 34, at 7 (finding that the
UDHR and ICCPR present more restrictive versions of the right to culture than is
presented in the ICESCR).
43. See UDHR, supra note 25, art. 27(1) ("Everyone has the right freely to
participate in the cultural life of the community . . ."); see also Stamatopoulou,
supra note 39, at 10 (noting that the language of Article 27 of the UDHR assumes
that cultural participation would take place only in the culture of the nation-state);
Patrick Thornberry, Cultural Rights and Universality of Human Rights, submitted
to U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/40/15
(May 9, 2008) (citing JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT 269 (1999)) (arguing that by
failing to include language granting a person the right to participate in the cultural
life of "his or her" community, Article 27(1) "assume[s] that 'the community' one
participates in and with which one identifies culturally is the dominant community
of the nation-State").
44. See ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 27 ("persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group,
to enjoy their own culture . . .").
45. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (granting to the Human Rights
Committee the responsibility of hearing complaints from individuals claiming to
be victims of ICCPR violations).
46. See MELIK OZDEN WITH FRANCOIS NDAGIJIMANA, THE CASE FOR A
PROTOCOL TO THE ICESCR!: WHAT IS AT STAKE IN THE PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT FOR COMPLAINTS AND COMMUNICATION AND FOR
EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS" 3, 15, available at
http://www.cetim.ch/en/documents/ bro3-pidesc-A4-an.pdf (encouraging the
adoption of a complaints mechanism for the ICESCR to afford economic, social,
and cultural rights the same status and respect internationally as is given to civil
and political rights).
47. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
2011]1 1447
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Optional Protocol, and it will not go into effect until three months
after ten states have signed and ratified.4 8
The credibility of civil and political rights is bolstered by the
ability of individuals to lodge complaints with the HRC, leading
many states to undervalue the legitimacy of economic, social, and
cultural rights by claiming the ICESCR lacks enforceability.49
Moreover, without a complaints mechanism, the CESCR is unable to
develop the meaning of the right to take part in cultural life as it
applies in individual situations, leaving states with little guidance in
determining the applicability of this right within their domestic legal
systems.so The ICCPR further demands greater compliance because it
provides fewer opportunities for its recognized rights to be limited by
states" and imposes more demanding obligations upon states parties
than does the ICESCR.5 2
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008)
(delineating the scope of the CESCR's power to hear claims and describing the
complaints process).
48. See id. art. 18; Status of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties. aspx?id=4&subid=A&1ang--en (select link
"3.a." in table) (last visited May 19, 2011) (showing that Ecuador, Mongolia, and
Spain are the only states to ratify the Optional Protocol).
49. See OZDEN WITH NDAGIJIMANA, supra note 46, at 14 (arguing that the lack
of an international mechanism to rebuke violations of economic, social, and
cultural rights necessitates the adoption of a complaints mechanism for the
ICESCR to reinforce the equal importance of all human rights).
50. Cf ELSA STAMATOPOULOU, CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ARTICLE 27 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BEYOND
107 (2007) (suggesting that vagueness in the normative content of the right to
participate in cultural life made it difficult to hold states accountable); OZDEN WITH
NDAGIJIMANA, supra note 46, at 8 (indicating that complaints procedures help to
clarify the scope of rights that the international oversight bodies oversee, because
by considering the applicability of the rights in various factual situations, the rights
are developed and their scope is better understood).
51. Compare ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 4 (permitting the limitation of rights
to promote the general welfare of a democratic society, so long as the limitation is
compatible with the nature of the rights in the ICESCR), with ICCPR, supra note
26, art. 4(1) (allowing states to limit certain rights during an official state
emergency to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, so long as the
limiting measures do not discriminate solely on the basis of race, color, sex,
language, religion, or social origin).
52. See DOWELL-JONES, supra note 34, at 2 (suggesting that the differences
between the obligations of states under the ICESCR and the ICCPR encourages
states to view civil and political rights as rights that should be immediately
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A particular area of confusion concerning the right to take part in
cultural life is its relationship with the rights of minorities." Unlike
rights that are overseen by monitoring bodies with complaints
procedure mechanisms, the relationship between the right to take part
in cultural life and the rights of minorities did not develop through
case law.5 4 The jurisprudence of the HRC regarding Article 27 of the
ICCPR proves helpful, however, in demonstrating the developing
views within the international community related to minorities and
their right to culture." In 4dreld v. Finland, the HRC articulated a
test that establishes whether cultural rights of minority groups were
violated by determining whether the challenged action or restriction
made an impact that was so substantial that it effectively denied the
complainants the right to enjoy their culture."6 The absence of a
common understanding of the right to take part in cultural life leaves
unanswered whether such a test would be relevant in enforcing
Article 15(l)(a) of the ICESCR and makes the obligations of states
guaranteed and enforced, but economic, social, and cultural rights as rights that
need only be promoted under the discretion of the state and that are not capable of
judicial enforcement). Compare ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2(1) (articulating that
states are only obligated to take steps to progressively achieve the full realization
of the recognized rights), with ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 2 (requiring states parties
to respect and ensure the recognized rights to all individuals subject to state
jurisdiction and to provide an effective remedy to individuals whose rights were
violated).
53. See generally STAMATOPOULOU, supra note 39, at 163-29 (discussing the
status of minorities in various legal instruments, including the ICESCR).
54. See OZDEN WITH NDAGIJIMANA, supra note 46, at 8 (articulating how
international committees with complaint procedure mechanisms are able to clarify
the scope of the rights they oversee by hearing cases).
55. See ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 27. See generally Int'l Comm'n of Jurists,
supra note 34, at 8 (looking to the jurisprudence of the HRC for examples of the
adjudication of cultural rights); DONDERS, supra note 28, at 176-88 (presenting
HRC case law that clarifies the content and scope of Article 27 of the ICCPR and
illustrates the types of claims made under the provision).
56. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Aireld v. Finland, Comm. No. 779/1997,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (Nov. 7, 2001) (finding insufficient
information to determine whether Finland's logging practices so substantially
interfered with the reindeer husbandry practices of the complainants as to deny the
complainants the right to enjoy their own culture); see also U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Mavlonov v. Uzbekistan, Comm. No. 1334/2004, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 (Apr. 29, 2009) (holding that by refusing re-registration
to the only newspaper specifically tailored to the Tajik minority group, Uzbekistan
unlawfully interfered with the right of that minority group to enjoy its own culture
under Article 27).
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regarding the protection of minority cultures unclear."
3. The Incorporation of General Comment No. 21 Into the
Understanding of the Right to Take Part in Cultural Life
As a response to the confusion surrounding the right to take part in
cultural life, the CESCR issued General Comment No. 21 on Article
15(1)(a) in December 2009.8 Through General Comment No. 21, the
CESCR attempts to clarify the appropriate interpretation of the right
to take part in cultural life. The CESCR adopts a broad definition of
culture5 9 and specifically states that Article 15(l)(a) conveys to
minorities both the right to take part in the cultural life of society and
the right to participate in their own culture.6 0
General Comment No. 21 also discusses the permissible
limitations to the right to take part in cultural life.6 1 Specifically,
General Comment No. 21 emphasizes that cultural rights may be
limited if they infringe upon other guaranteed human rights.6 2
Additionally, General Comment No. 21 further clarifies the
obligations of states parties to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to
take part in cultural life. 63 While General Comment No. 21 attempts
57. Cf OZDEN WITH NDAGIJIMANA, supra note 46, at 8 (noting that a
complaints procedure would clarify the scope of the obligations of states parties
under the ICESCR).
58. Cf U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on the 7th Sess.,
Nov. 13-Dec. 11, 1992, 49, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1992/2 (1993) [hereinafter Report
on the 7th Sess.] (remarking that the purpose of general comments is to provide
clarity to states parties about the rights granted in the ICESCR with the aim of
further promoting the implementation of the covenant). See generally General
Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 4-5 (stating that General Comment No. 21
addresses the right to take part in cultural life and that the CESCR gained
experience on the subject through considering reports, communicating with states,
and through two general discussion sessions on the topic).
59. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 11 (defining culture as a
"broad, inclusive concept encompassing all manifestations of human existence").
60. See id. 32 (declaring that minorities as a group and as individuals are
afforded the right to participate in any culture they choose and that this right
includes a right to manifest their cultural identity and membership).
61. See id. 19 (explaining that any limitations must pursue a legitimate goal,
be compatible with the nature of the right to take part in cultural life, be necessary
to promote the general welfare, and be the least restrictive measure available).
62. See id. (acknowledging that limitations to the right to take part in cultural
life may be necessary, particularly in cases of negative cultural practices that
infringe upon other human rights).
63. See id. 44-55 (articulating the obligations of states parties relating to the
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to resolve the confusion surrounding the right to take part in cultural
life,6 4 the efficacy of General Comment No. 21 has yet to be tested.
B. THE FRENCH INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO TAKE PART IN
CULTURAL LIFE
Because of the broad wording of Article 15(l)(a), states developed
and followed their own interpretations of the right to take part in
cultural life. France interprets Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR as
granting its citizens a right to take part in the cultural life of the
community, synonymous with Article 27(1) of the UDHR.66 France
demonstrated this interpretation when it issued a reservation to the
ICCPR, stating that France refuses to acknowledge Article 27 and
thereby refuses to grant minorities the right to take part in their own
culture.
right to take part in cultural life, including minimum core obligations: guaranteeing
non-discrimination and gender equality, respecting the right of everyone to choose
to identify or not identify with any culture, respecting the right of everyone to
engage in their own cultural practices, eliminating obstacles that inhibit a person's
access to his own culture, and allowing the participation of persons belonging to
minority groups in the design and implementation of laws and policies that affect
them).
64. Cf Report on the 7th Sess., supra note 58, 49 (stating that the CESCR
uses general comments to help states parties implement the ICESCR by sharing
with states the experience the CESCR gains through examining state reports).
65. See Yvonne Donders, Cultural Life in the Context of Human Rights,
submitted to U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, at 2, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/40/13 (May 9, 2008) (noting that there is no consensus on which rights
constitute "cultural rights" and how best to implement them); cf Thornberry, supra
note 43, at 2-3 (suggesting that the concept of culture is particularly complicated,
and states need guidance on what the right to take part in cultural life actually
entails).
66. See UDHR, supra note 25, art. 27(1) (stating that "[e]veryone has the right
freely to participate in the cultural life of the community").
67. Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsgno=IV-4&chapter-4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter
ICCPR Status] (displaying France's reservation to the ICCPR, which states that
France refuses to recognize Article 27 because it believes Article 27 conflicts with
the French Constitution); cf ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 27 (granting minorities the
right to take part in their own culture); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: France, 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/l/Add.72
(Nov. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Concluding Observations] (expressing concern about
the French government's refusal to officially recognize the existence of minorities
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France's view on minorities stems from its belief that its
Constitution and commitment to equality and secularism do not
permit an official recognition of minority classifications. 68 The
French Constitution guarantees the "equality of all citizens before the
law without distinction of origin, race or religion." 69 Because France
does not acknowledge minority groups within its territory,70
minorities in France are not given special measures or protections
and are instead encouraged to assimilate into French society.7'
C. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH BAN ON BURQAS
France's history is one of promoting secularism and
encouraging a singular cultural identity within its territory.7 2 The
recent increases in globalization and immigration throughout Europe,
however, threaten this ideal.73 France is currently host to around five
within French territory). See generally DONDERS, supra note 28, at 187 (arguing
that by declaring a reservation to Article 27 and denying the existence of
minorities within its territory, France greatly interfered with minority rights and
such reservations today "would no longer be permissible" because denying the
existence of minorities is contrary to "customary international law and peremptory
norms").
68. See 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.), translated in ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE,
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp (last visited May 2, 2011); U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council, Third Periodic Rep. of France on Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/FRA/3 (Mar. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Third Periodic Report] (declaring that
to recognize the collective rights of minority groups would be to distinguish those
citizens on the basis of origin, race, or religion, violating Article 1 of the French
Constitution).
69. 1958 CONsT. art. 1 (Fr.), translated in ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE,
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp (last visited May 2, 2011).
70. See Third Periodic Report, supra note 68, 44 (explaining that while public
expressions of diversity are legal, the rights of minority groups cannot be legally
recognized under the French Constitution).
71. Cf DONDERS, supra note 28, at 186 (suggesting that by officially refusing
to recognize minorities, a state interferes with minority rights because the denial
implies that there is no need for special measures or protections for minorities
since they will automatically be assimilated).
72. See Bienkowski, supra note 30, at 437 (arguing that France's strong
assimilationist and secular tradition relegates religion to the private sphere and
reserves the public sphere for unique French culture and values).
73. See Barbibay, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining that due to a growing
population of Islamic immigrants in France, the country is strained by conflicting
demands of protecting the individual human rights of the Islamic immigrants and
preserving its own cultural uniqueness).
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million Muslims, the largest Muslim population in Europe.7 4 As a
result of the increasing Muslim population in France, the French
government is concerned about the threat that overt expressions of
Islam, such as wearing the burqa or niqab, pose to the French ideals
of secularism and gender equality.
In 2004, France banned the hijab 76 from being worn in schools; an
act that potentially further marginalized French Muslim schoolgirls,
even forcing some to be homeschooled.7 7 The French government
cited preserving secularism as a justification for the ban on the
hijab. 8 France, however, is not alone in its disdain for the Muslim
garments, as citizens in several other states also support banning the
74. See Hundreds in Pakistan Protest France's Burqa Ban, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 19, 2010, available at http://www.ndtv. com/article/world/hundres-in-
pakistan-protest-france-s-burqa-ban-38407 (noting that many people are especially
concerned about the French ban on burqas because of France's high Muslim
population).
75. See Barbibay, supra note 29, at 160-61 (arguing that France associates
Islamic clothing with issues of gender equality, assimilation, and the threat of
religious fundamentalism, and that as France's Islamic population grows, these
issues have been thrust into the forefront of French politics).
76. See In Graphics: Muslim Veils, supra note 4 (defining the hijab as a
headscarf that covers the head and neck, but leaves the face visible).
77. See Loi 2004-228 du mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de
laicit6, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appurtenance religieuse dans
les 6coles, colleges et lyc6es publics [Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004
regulating, in accordance with the principle of secularism, the wearing of symbols
or clothing denoting religious affiliation in schools, colleges and high schools],
JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190; Oriana Mazza, Note, The Right to Wear
Headscarves and Other Religious Symbols in French, Turkish, and American
Schools: How the Government Draws a Veil on Free Expression of Faith, 48 J.
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304, 306 (2009) (suggesting that despite claims the ban
would protect girls from oppressive males and would free the girls from pressure
while at school, the ban would actually cause many girls to leave school altogether,
leading to a lack of education and to further opportunities for male oppression at
home).
78. See Mazza, supra note 77, at 309-10 (noting that French secularism, which
relegates religion to the private sphere, conflicts with many Islamic immigrants
who perceive Islam as a way of life that permeates both the public and private
spheres); see also Caroline Wyatt, French Headscarf Ban Opens Rifts, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 11, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3478895.stm (identifying UMP deputy,
J6r6me Rivibre, as saying that a minority of "hardline Islamists" were challenging
French secular nature and that the ban is not about suppression of freedom but is a
political answer to a political problem).
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burqa, niqab, and hijab."9
Since 2004, France has continued its practice of discouraging any
expression of Muslim culture and religion based on France's policy
of promoting a singular French culture and identity. 0 In September
2010, the French Senate adopted a law that in effect, imposed a
complete ban on wearing the burqa and niqab in all public places."'
On October 7, 2010 the French Constitutional Council, the top
constitutional authority in France, ruled that the law was legal, and
the ban went into effect April 11, 2011.82
79. See, e.g., James Joyner, French Burqa Ban Widely Supported in Europe,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.acus.org/
newatlanticist/french-burqa-ban-widely-supported-europe (indicating that the
majority of citizens in the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Germany support the
imposition of a ban on the burqa in their own states, while the majority of citizens
in the United States disapprove of such a ban); Chalabi, supra note 3 (noting that
Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia all banned burqas and niqabs to prohibit the influence
of Islamic party politics); Hundreds in Pakistan Protest France's Burqa Ban,
supra note 74 (stating that Spain and Belgium are working on imposing similar
bans on Islamic coverings).
80. See, e.g., Bienkowski, supra note 30, at 438-39 (describing France's refusal
to grant citizenship to a woman in 2008 because France claimed that by continuing
to wear a niqab, she did not fulfill "the condition of assimilation necessary for
attainment of French citizenship").
81. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the
Concealment of the Face in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRAN(AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344; see
also Burqa Ban Passes French Lower House Overwhelmingly, CNN (July 13,
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/07/13/france.burqa.ban/index.
html (explaining that the ban passed almost unanimously, indicating that French
lawmakers believe the full-face veil is contrary to the laws of France).
82. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-
613DC, Oct. 7, 2010, J.O. 18345 (Fr.) (holding the ban was not "disproportionate
between safeguarding public order and guaranteeing constitutionally protected
rights"); see also French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, CNN (Oct. 7,
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-07/world/france.burqa.ban 1 french-burqa-
ban-ban-last-year-full-face-veil?s=PM:WORLD (stating that the French
constitutional authorities determined the "law did not impose disproportionate
punishments or prevent the free exercise of religion in a place of worship," and
therefore, the law is legal under the French Constitution); Russell Goldman,
Muslim Women Arrested for Defying France's Ban on Wearing Veils, ABCNEWS
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/french-muslim-women-
arrested-defying-ban-wearing-veils/story?id=13347753 (reporting that on the day
the ban went into effect, two Muslim women were arrested after wearing their veils
in public while protesting the ban).
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The law prohibits all face coverings in public, but through the
inclusion of several exceptions it is clear that the law is aimed at
prohibiting burqas and niqabs. 3 The law imposes either a small fine
or citizenship course as punishment for wearing the burqa or niqab
and imposes a year prison sentence or a E 30,000 fine, approximately
$43,287 USD, on anyone who forces someone else to wear a burqa
or niqab.84 The ban is controversial, but the French government
claims it is necessary to protect the rights of its citizens and to
protect French society." While many European states support the
ban, other states and many international organizations oppose or
condemn the law as a violation of human rights and international
treaties.86
83. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the
Concealment of the Face in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344; see
also Angela Doland, France Burqa Ban: French Parliament Approves Ban on
Face Veils, HUFFINGTON PosT (July 13, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/07/13/france-burqa-ban-french-p n_644433.html (commenting that although
the law generally prohibits concealing one's face in public, the inclusion of
exceptions for inter alia, motorcycle helmets and masks worn for health reasons,
for fencing, for skiing, or for carnivals, clearly demonstrates that the primary
purpose of the ban is to prohibit the wearing of burqas and niqabs).
84. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the
Concealment of the Face in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344; see
also French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, supra note 82 (noting that the
law imposes a much harsher punishment upon those who force a woman to wear a
niqab or burqa than the fine on those women caught wearing it willingly, and that
the French government referred to the burqa and niqab as "a new form of
enslavement").
85. See France Burqa Ban Passes Last Legal Hurdle, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 7, 2010, available at http://www.newsmax.com/News
front/franceburqabanveil/2010/10/07/id/372997 (suggesting that while France
claims that the ban protects women's rights and affirms respect for freedoms of
conscience and religion, the ban is criticized as stigmatizing Muslims and as
possibly violating the French Constitution and religious freedoms protected by the
European Court of Human Rights).
86. E.g., Indonesia Ulema Council Opposes French Burqa Ban, JAKARTA
GLOBE, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/ home/indonesia-ulema-
council-opposes-french-burqas-ban/396230 (reporting the opposition of the
Indonesia Ulema Council to France's ban on burqas, and its belief that if France
"wants to champion human rights, it should allow women to wear the veils in




In General Comment No. 21, the CESCR significantly elaborates
on the meaning and scope of the right to take part in cultural life.87
The clarity offered by General Comment No. 21 effectively provides
states parties with a better understanding of their obligations related
to this right." The previously ambiguous nature of the right to take
part in cultural life provided too many opportunities for states to
encroach upon the cultural rights of their citizens, including enabling
France to ban the wearing of burqas in public. 89 Through General
Comment No. 21, however, the CESCR firmly establishes not only
that the right extends to minority cultures, but also that wearing a
burqa is a practice that is considered part of a person's "cultural life,"
and therefore, must be protected.9 0 The clarity offered by General
Comment No. 21 reveals that France cannot both enact the burqa ban
and still remain in compliance with its obligations under the
ICESCR.91
religious belief'); French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, supra note 82
(stating that Amnesty International accuses the ban of violating European human
rights law); Zeenat Umar, France Approves Burqa Ban, ILLUME, Sept. 15, 2010,
http://www.illumemag.com/zine/articleDetail. php?France-Approves-Burqa-Ban-
13317 (noting that President Obama implied that telling people what to wear is not
in line with the United States' culture and values).
87. See generally General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 6-43
(expounding upon the definition and scope of the right to take part in cultural life
and ensuring that it grants everyone the right to take part in the cultural life of their
choosing).
88. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 1 19 (requiring a legitimate
purpose for any limitation, use of the least restrictive measures available, and that
the limitation imposed be proportionate to the situation); discussion infra Part II.B
(demonstrating how General Comment No. 21 illustrates the appropriate scope of
the right to take part in the cultural life and better enables states to protect this right
for their citizens).
89. See discussion infra Part II.A (explaining how the ambiguity of the
ICESCR would have allowed France to prohibit people from engaging in minority
cultural practices).
90. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 16(a) (describing necessary
conditions for the full realization of the right of everyone to take part in cultural
life, including the availability of intangible elements of culture); discussion infra
Part II.B.1 (articulating how General Comment No. 21 specifically grants the right
to take part in cultural life to minorities and specifically expands "cultural life" to
include intangible elements of culture and cultural practices).
91. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (describing the specific obligations stated in




A. THE NEED FOR GENERAL COMMENT No. 21: THE VAGUE
LANGUAGE OF THE ICESCR PROVIDES LEGITIMATE
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FRENCH BURQA BAN
Many legal scholars believe the burqa ban violates several
international legal instruments that recognize a variety of human
rights. 92 In response, the French government invoked various
philosophical, political, and moral justifications for its ban on burqas
in public.93 If not for the introduction of General Comment No. 21,
France could argue that the ban fulfills France's obligation under
Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR to guarantee the equal right of
Muslim women forced to wear the burqa to take part in French
cultural life.94
1. The Failure ofArticle 15(1) (a) to Adequately Define the Right to
Take Part in Cultural Life Allows France to Claim that the Right
Does Not Extend to Protecting Cultural Practices ofMinorities and
that Burqas Do Not Fall Within the Concept of "Cultural Life"
Before General Comment No. 21, the definition of the right to take
part in cultural life and its resulting obligations on states party to the
92. See Burqa Ban Passes French Lower House Overwhelmingly, supra note
81 (quoting John Dalhuisen of Amnesty International as stating that "[a] complete
ban on [burqas] would violate the rights to freedom of expression and religion of
those women who wear the burqa or the niqab in public as an expression of
identity or beliefs," and explaining that the French Council of State warned the
French government "that the ban could be incompatible with international human
rights and the country's own constitution").
93. See, e.g., Coexistence Means Fighting Cultural Frictions, THE DAILY
YOMIURI, Sept. 18, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 18492579 (reporting that
proponents of the burqa ban argue that wearing burqas is contrary to the principle
of separation of church and state and contrary to the emancipation of women);
French Senate Approves Burqa Ban, CNN (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/WORLD/europe/09/14/france.burqa.ban/index.html?hpt=TI (quoting an
official statement of the French government that wearing the burqa cannot be
tolerated in public even if it is voluntary because of the "damage it produces on
those rules that allow the life in the community, ensure the dignity of the person
and equality between the sexes," and because the burqa is a "new form of
enslavement" that France cannot accept).
94. Cf ICESCR, supra note 13, arts. 2-3 (requiring that states parties
"undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the [ ] [ICESCR] will be
exercised without discrimination" on the basis of sex, and that states parties ensure
that men and women have equal opportunity to enjoy all the rights set forth in the
ICESCR).
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ICESCR was unsettled.9 5 Free to determine their own definition of
the right to take part in cultural life, many states, including France,
interpreted the right to be in line with Article 27(1) of the UDHR,
providing everyone with the right to participate in the cultural life of
the community." This interpretation is supported by the absence of
any mention of minorities or minority cultures in Article 15 of the
ICESCR97 and in the fact that the drafters of Article 15 originally
intended the right to apply only to the culture of the state.98
95. See Groni, supra note 34, at 4 (stating that "[t]here is still no generally
accepted definition of 'culture'," but under Article 15 'culture' should be
understood in the anthropological sense rather than just as the works and
knowledge accumulated or created by a group of elites); Int'l Comm'n of Jurists,
supra note 34, 1, 4 (noting that economic, social, and cultural rights are
criticized for being vague, and the adoption of a general comment would "help to
clarify the content and legal implications of the right to participate in cultural
life"); Int'l Women's Rights Action Watch, Equality and the Right to Participate
in Cultural Life, submitted to U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, T 2,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12./40/10 (May 9, 2008) (suggesting that "the right to equal
participation in cultural life" is one of the most hotly contested and misunderstood
rights enumerated in the ICESCR).
96. See UDHR, supra note 25, art. 27(1) ("Everyone has the right freely to
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits."). Compare U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Combined Initial, Second and Third Periodic Rep., Under Articles 16 and 17 of the
Covenant, of Angola on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 308-12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AGO/3 (Apr.
28, 2008) (discussing Angola's efforts to promote its national culture under the
right to participate in cultural life but failing to address minority cultural rights),
and Third Periodic Report, supra note 70, T 44 (suggesting that under the French
Constitution, the French government cannot distinguish people based on origin,
race, or religion, and therefore, collective rights of minorities are not recognized
under the right to cultural life), with U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Initial Rep. of
Albania on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 574-76, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.67 (Apr. 11, 2005)
(describing efforts of the Albanian government to explicitly promote and protect
minority cultures under the right to take part in cultural life).
97. Cf ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 15(l)(a) (including only the right "to take
part in cultural life," the right "to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress," and the
right "to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production"); DONDERS, supra note 28, at
152 (citing Samba Cor Konat6, Working Paper on Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1992/WP.4 (Nov. 25, 1992)) (indicating that the drafters of the ICESCR
limited their interpretation of "culture" to its tangible manifestations, e.g.
museums, libraries, and art).
98. See Donders, supra note 65, at 4 (noting that at the time of adoption of
Article 15(l)(a), the right to take part in cultural life was meant to protect
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Additionally, since Article 27 of the ICCPR specifically grants to
minorities the right to participate in their own culture, it would be
redundant for Article 15(1)(a) to grant the same right." It is clear that
France subscribed to this argument because it registered a reservation
to Article 27 of the ICCPR, but did not declare a similar reservation
to Article 15(l)(a). 00 If France believed Article 15(l)(a) also granted
minorities the right to take part in their own culture, it follows that it
would make a reservation to Article 15(l)(a) to ensure the relevance
of its reservation to Article 27.01 Therefore, France could claim that
the right of the Muslim minority in France to wear the burqa is not
protected under the right to take part in cultural life by suggesting
Article 15(1)(a) only protects the right to take part in the cultural life
of the state, not the right to engage in the cultural life of the minority
Muslim community.'0 2
Moreover, because there was no clear definition of what
constituted "cultural life," France could argue that the practice of
wearing the burqa does not fall within the concept of culture
protected by Article 15(1)(a), and therefore, a limitation upon this
practice does not violate the ICESCR. Many scholars consider the
text of Article 15(l)(a) to only grant rights to take part in "high
culture," meaning cultural activities or items such as artwork, theater,
or museums." Before General Comment No. 21, it was unclear
participation in the cultural life of the nation, not to protect participation in every
cultural activity).
99. See Groni, supra note 34, at 10 (suggesting that due to the existence of
Article 27, one could conclude that the scope of Article 15(1)(a) does not protect
the right of minority groups or their individual members to take part in their own
culture).
100. Compare ICCPR Status, supra note 67, at 6 (exhibiting France's registered
reservation denying recognition of Article 27 of the ICCPR), with ICESCR Status,
supra note 14, at 4 (lacking a French reservation to Article 15(1)(a) of ICESCR).
101. Cf Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining "reservation" as a unilateral statement that "purports
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State").
102. Cf DONDERS, supra note 28, at 157 (citing Roger O'Keefe, The "Right to
Take Part in Cultural Life" Under Article 15 of the ICESCR, 47 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 904, 912-13 (1998)) (noting that the drafters of Article 15(1)(a) did not intend
for the right to take part in cultural life to imply that the masses could determine in
which cultural activities Article 15(1)(a) granted them a right to take part).
103. See id. at 150 (noting that at the time of its adoption, Article 15 was
primarily meant to make more broadly available the "'high' material aspects of
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whether "cultural life" also referred to intangible cultural elements
such as language, traditions, or practices.'" Therefore, France could
claim that because wearing a burqa was not an element of high
culture, such a practice does not fall within the originally intended
definition of "cultural life" and consequently did not need to be
protected under Article l5(1)(a).o5
2. The Language of the ICESCR Allows France to Claim the Burqa
Ban Helps Fulfill France's Obligations Under the ICESCR and is an
Acceptable Limitation of the Right to Take Part in Cultural Life
Based on the French belief that the right to take part in cultural life
refers only to the cultural life of French society,106 France could
justify its ban on burqas using Article 15(1)(a). The ICESCR
instructs states parties to provide their citizens with the ability to
exercise their right to take part in cultural life."' France perceives the
burqa as a restriction on the rights of its female Muslim citizens to
fully participate in French society.'"0 Under the ICESCR, the French
culture"); cf Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 34, 6 (describing "high culture"
as the narrower of two definitions traditionally applied to the notion of "culture,"
and urging the CESCR to adopt the broader definition, which includes the aspects
of high culture as well as "language, traditions, folklore, institutions, practices, and
shared views of the world which determine the way in which communities define
their identity").
104. See Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 34, 6 (encouraging the CESCR to
adopt a broad definition of "culture" that includes intangible cultural elements so
that the definition "is more appropriate for a right which is predicated of
'everyone' and not only of authors of scientific, literary or artistic production").
105. Cf DONDERS, supra note 28, at 152 (citing Samba Cor Konat6, Working
Paper on Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1992/WP.4 (Nov. 25, 1992)) (noting
that the drafters of Article 15(l)(a) intended a conception of culture that focused
on extemal manifestations of national heritage, such as libraries, museums, and
artwork).
106. See Third Periodic Report, supra note 68, 44 (refusing to grant minorities
the right to take part in their own culture because France does not recognize
minority cultures).
107. See ICESCR, supra note 13, arts. 2(l)-(2), 15(l)(a) (instructing states to
take progressive steps to fully realize all of the rights recognized in the Covenant,
including cultural rights).
108. See Doland, supra note 83 (presenting the French view that burqas
reinforce the inequality between men and women and are, therefore, contrary to
French ideology and tradition); cf French a Step Closer to Banning the Burqa,
ADVERTISER, Sept. 16, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 18289865 (remarking that
other European countries, such as Belgium, are following the French lead and
considering similar bans on burqas because burqas are seen as conflicting with
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government is obligated to prevent such a restriction."o' Therefore,
France could argue that the burqa ban fulfills its obligations, under
the ICESCR, to protect the right to take part in cultural life by
removing an impediment to the ability of French Muslim women to
enjoy full and equal participation in French culture.
Additionally, even if France viewed wearing the burqa as a part of
cultural life that is afforded protection under Article 15(l)(a), it still
could limit that right under the ICESCR.110 Before General Comment
No. 21, the ICESCR allowed states to limit the rights recognized in
the ICESCR when the limitation was compatible with the nature of
the rights and was used to promote the "general welfare" in a
democratic society."' France suggested such justifications for its
ban,1 2 including claims that the burqa ban protects the general
welfare of French society by reinforcing French ideals and protecting
national security.1 13
The absence of a complaints mechanism for the ICESCR means
there are no recognized parameters on this limitation.1 14 While states
can use the case law of the HRC to determine the scope of the rights
local culture).
109. See ICESCR, supra note 13, arts. 2(l)-(2), 15(1)(a) (requiring states to
"guarantee" that the rights set forth in the ICESCR are exercised without
discrimination based on sex).
110. See generally id. art. 4 (allowing states to limit the rights granted by the
ICESCR "for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic
society").
11l. See id. (determining that the meaning of "general welfare" is left up to the
states).
112. Burqa Ban Passes French Lower House Overwhelmingly, supra note 81
(reflecting on the French government's assertion that the burqa, even if voluntarily
worn, cannot be tolerated in public because it negatively affects the rules
governing French life by degrading the dignity of women and denying equality
between sexes).
113. See Doland, supra note 83 (indicating that the burqa is viewed as a
"gateway to extremism and an attack on secularism"); Burqa Ban Passes French
Lower House Overwhelmingly, supra note 81 (analogizing the burqa to slavery and
calling for its prohibition); Hundreds in Pakistan Protest France's Burqa Ban,
supra note 74 (commenting that supporters of the burqa ban argue that burqas do
not coincide with the French ideals of gender equality and secularism).
114. See OZDEN WITH NDAGIJIMANA, supra note 46, at 3-6 (suggesting that a
complaints procedure would constrain countries that do not comply with their
ICESCR commitments and would provide citizens recourse in situations of alleged
violations).
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or obligations under the ICCPR,"' there is no case law that provides
examples of what state actions do or do not constitute acceptable
limitations of the right to take part in cultural life under the
ICESCR.116 Moreover, unlike the HRC, which supplied the "so
substantial" test,"' the CESCR does not supply states with a
balancing test to measure the importance of restrictions on a cultural
right against the value of that cultural right." States are not required
to consult with any individual, agency, or community before limiting
the cultural rights of its citizens."l 9 Therefore, prior to the existence
of General Comment No. 21, France could, without being in
violation of the ICESCR, use its broad discretion to impose the ban
on burqas and claim the ban actually fulfills France's obligations
under the ICESCR by protecting the rights of Muslim women to
fully participate in French culture.
115. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Lansman v. Finland, Comm. No.
671/1995, 1, 2.1, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (Nov. 22, 1996)
(holding that the government's logging activities were not so severe as to violate
the plaintiffs rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Mavlonov v. Uzbekistan, Comm. No. 1334/2004, IM 2.1, 2.6, 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 (Apr. 29, 2009) (finding that a state's denial of
registration to the only newspaper specifically tailored to a particular culture
sufficiently interfered with the rights of that community to enjoy its own culture
and that the state's actions were a violation of ICCPR Articles 19 and 27).
116. See MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS
DEVELOPMENT 100-01 (1995) (discussing how the adoption of a complaints
mechanism for the ICESCR would produce case law that states could use to
determine the specific actions required of them).
117. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Adreld v. Finland, Comm. No. 779/1997,
4.3, 7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (Nov. 7, 2001) (articulating that the
appropriate test is whether the imposition on the plaintiffs rights was "so
substantial" as to unlawfully interfere with the plaintiffs right to enjoy his
culture).
118. Cf Groni, supra note 34, at 5-6 (noting that the CESCR guidelines are
ambiguous as to what is protected by the right to take part in cultural life, and
suggesting that the right should be evaluated against the extent a restriction
violates human dignity and individual identity).
119. See ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2(1)-(3) (lacking any requirements of
consultation in the obligatory provisions of the ICESCR).
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B. IMPOSING CLARITY: THROUGH GENERAL COMMENT No. 21,
THE CESCR NEGATES THE PREVIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
FRENCH BURQA BAN AND ESTABLISHES THAT THE BAN IS A
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO TAKE PART IN CULTURAL LIFE
While the burqa ban would not likely violate the ICESCR pre-
General Comment No. 21, the guidance and clarity provided by
General Comment No. 21 make the illegality of the French burqa ban
more readily apparent under Article 15(1)(a). The clarification
provided by the CESCR related to the obligations of states under the
ICESCR demonstrates that the burqa ban is inconsistent with
France's obligations under Article 15(1)(a).120 Moreover, the more
specific descriptions of the scope and meaning of the right to take
part in cultural life further establish the illegality of the French burqa
ban under Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR.121
1. General Comment No. 21 Establishes that the Right to Take Part
in Cultural Life Does Extend to Protecting the Cultural Practices of
Minorities and that Wearing a Burqa is a Practice Included Within
the Concept of "Cultural Life"
General Comment No. 21 elaborates on the definition and scope of
the right to take part in cultural life.122 In General Comment No. 21
the CESCR defines the right to take part in cultural life as
encompassing the scope of both the right to participate in the cultural
life of society, provided by Article 27(1) of the UDHR, and the right
of minorities to take part in their own culture, granted in Article 27
of the ICCPR.123 According to General Comment No. 21, Article
120. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (describing the inconsistency of the burqa
ban and the simultaneous obligation to provide citizens with an environment that
enables them to participate in the culture of their choice).
121. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the CESCR's extension of the
right to take part in cultural life to minorities and minority cultures).
122. See generally General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 6-43 (flushing
out the scope in four primary ways: (1) by defining the components, elements, and
limitations of the right to take part in cultural life; (2) by describing special topics
of broad application; (3) by identifying persons and communities requiring special
protection; and (4) by discussing cultural diversity and its relation to the right to
take part in cultural life).
123. See id. T 3 (referencing other international agreements that recognize the
right of all people to take part in cultural life, including the UDHR and the
ICCPR); see also ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 27 (granting minorities the right to
develop and take part in their own culture); UDHR, supra note 25, art. 27(1)
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15(l)(a) grants everyone, including minorities, the right to take part
in the cultural life of their choice, whether it is the majority culture of
society, a minority culture, or both.124
Additionally, General Comment No. 21 defines "everyone" as
comprising not only the individual, but also the collective.125
Consequently, not only do people possess the right to take part in the
cultural life of their choice as an individual, but also as part of a
group or community of people who are exercising their cultural
rights together. 12 6 As a result, France cannot refuse to recognize
minority groups or the collective rights of minorities, and still remain
in compliance with its obligations under the ICESCR.1'27
General Comment No. 21 also expresses concern about protecting
cultural diversity during an era of increasing globalization.128 The
CESCR recognizes that globalization necessitates the coexistence of
different cultures.'29 This is the antithesis of the position of the
French government, which denies recognition to minority groups and
instead promotes a unified, singular culture French culture.' 30 By
directly encouraging the preservation of cultural diversity, General
Comment No. 21 supplies a modern understanding of the right to
(proclaiming the right of everyone to participate in the cultural life of society).
124. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, TT 15(a), 32 (stating that
every person, regardless of his or her status as a minority, is afforded the right to
engage in the political and cultural life of society, as well as the right to engage in
the cultural practices of any culture in which he or she chooses to participate).
125. See id 9 (concluding that cultural rights can be exercised by individuals,
associations of people, or persons within a group or community).
126. See id. (maintaining that the collective expression of cultural rights focuses
on the right of "a person" to exercise his cultural rights "in association with others"
or "within a community," but does not grant those rights directly to the community
as a separate entity).
127. See id. 32 (proclaiming that states party to the ICESCR are obligated to
"recognize, respect and protect minority cultures as an essential component of the
identity of the States themselves").
128. See id. 40-43 (arguing that states must protect cultural diversity from the
negative effects of globalization by enabling "all cultures to express themselves
and make themselves known").
129. Id. 42.
130. See Barbibay, supra note 29, at 173-74 (noting that France refuses to
recognize a Muslim "minority" because it perceives itself as "indivisible based on
its aspiration" for a legally, socially, and culturally unified Republic); Bienkowski,
supra note 30, at 437-39 (arguing that France's tradition of assimilation aims to




take part in cultural life that seeks to emphasize the importance of
protecting minority cultures.13 1 Consequently, if France wants to be
in harmony with the ICESCR, it cannot deny recognition of the
Muslim minority in France or refuse the Muslim minority the right to
take part in and preserve its own cultural practices, including
wearing the burqa.
Moreover, the CESCR also supports an inclusive definition of
"cultural life" in General Comment No. 21.132 Under General
Comment No. 21, "cultural life" is not limited to "high culture" but
instead includes intangible elements of culture as well.133 General
Comment No. 21 defines culture as encompassing any practice or
object through which individuals, groups, or communities express
the "meaning they give to their existence" and through which they
"build their world view."1 3 4
Culture encompasses ways of life, religion or belief systems,
clothing, customs and traditions, and others according to General
Comment No. 21.135 The burqa, a piece of clothing worn by women
as a custom or tradition, to express a religion or a belief system, to
demonstrate a way of life, or for many other reasons, 3 6 clearly falls
within the concept of culture articulated in General Comment No.
21.137 Therefore, the clarity offered by General Comment No. 21
forecloses France's ability to claim its ban does not affect an element
131. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 32-33, 40-43
(characterizing the protection of cultural diversity as an ethical imperative).
132. See id. 11 (including "all manifestations of human existence" within the
concept of culture).
133. See id. 13 (indicating that cultural life includes, inter alia, ways of life,




136. See Nusrat Choudhury, From the Stasi Commission to the European Court
ofHuman Rights: L'Affaire Du Foulard and the Challenge ofProtecting the Rights
of Muslim Girls, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 199, 223-26 (2007) (citing a variety
of reasons that Muslim women choose to wear head coverings, including: "to
assert the identity and existence of a 'confident Muslim community in the West
and to demand fuller social and political recognition"'; to express personal
religious conviction; to assert an ethno-cultural identity; as a political protest; and
as a rebellion against parents).
137. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, T 13 (including clothing,
"customs and traditions," and "religion or belief systems" in the list of things
protected by the right to take part in cultural life).
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of culture that is protected by the right to take part in cultural life."'
2. General Comment No. 21 Establishes More Specific Obligations
that Demonstrate the Burqa Ban is No Longer an Acceptable
Limitation of the Right to Take Part in Cultural Life and that Require
France to Allow its Citizens to Participate in the Culture of Their
Choice
Another obstacle France faces as a result of General Comment No.
21 relates to the specific obligations imposed upon states parties.
Though obligations on states under the ICESCR-to take steps to
progressively achieve the full realization of the rights-could be
satisfied fairly easily,3 9 General Comment No. 21 requires much
more of states parties. 140 General Comment No. 21 leaves fewer
opportunities for states to ignore the right to take part in cultural life
by thoroughly establishing the obligations to respect,14 1 protect,142
and fulfill1 43 this right.
138. See discussion, supra Part II.A.1 (explaining that before the introduction of
General Comment No. 21 France could argue that the right to take part in cultural
life only granted a right to high culture, not a right to wear a particular piece of
clothing).
139. See DOWELL-JONES, supra note 34, at 2 (positing that the ICESCR
obligation to protect socio-economic rights "progressively as resources allow"
gives states wide discretion in allocating the proper resources to ensure those
rights). See generally ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2(1) (directing states to use "all
appropriate means" to ensure the protection of rights under the ICESCR).
140. See generally General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 44-59
(presenting not just general obligations, but also numerous specific, core, and
international legal obligations of states party to the ICESCR under the right to take
part in cultural life).
141. See id. 49 (indicating that the obligation to respect includes adopting
specific measures to allow individuals or groups to "freely choose their own
cultural identity," "to have access to their own cultural" heritage and to the cultural
heritage of others, and to take part in any "decision-making process that may have
an impact" on their way of life).
142. See id. 50 (stating that the obligation to protect requires states to "take
measures to prevent third parties from interfering in the exercise of' the right to
take part in cultural life by protecting cultural heritage and "cultural productions of
indigenous people," such as traditional knowledge, folklore, etc., and requires
states to "enforce legislation to prohibit discrimination based on cultural identity").
143. See id. 51-54 (finding that the obligation to fulfill includes: facilitating
the realization of the right through financial support; promoting the right through
education and public awareness; and providing whatever is necessary to assist




Respecting the right to take part in cultural life prohibits states
from interfering with its enjoyment by citizens,144 while protecting
the right requires states to prevent third parties from interfering with
its enjoyment. 145 The French government claims the burqa interferes
with the ability of women to participate in the cultural life of French
society. 146 France, therefore, may try to argue that the burqa ban
protects the right of these women to take part in French cultural life
by preventing men or other third parties from interfering with a
woman's enjoyment of this right by forcing her to wear a burqa or
niqab. 147 By prohibiting women from wearing the burqa, however,
France is also interfering with the rights of women who choose to
wear the burqa to express their cultural identity, and is therefore not
respecting their right to take part in the cultural life of their choice. 148
The CESCR also uses General Comment No. 21 to articulate
minimum core obligations of states party to the ICESCR regarding
the right to take part in cultural life.14 9 The CESCR emphasizes that
144. Id. T 48.
145. Id.
146. See Barbibay, supra note 29, at 161, 196-98 (characterizing France's view
of the burqa and niqab as contrary to the French core value of gender equality and
noting that France denied citizenship to a woman who wore a niqab based on her
failure to assimilate into French culture); Bienkowski, supra note 30, at 438-39
(quoting France's immigration minister, Eric Besson, as saying that he wanted the
wearing of the burqa or niqab to be "systematically considered as proof of
insufficient integration into French society," which would pose a substantial
obstacle to achieving French citizenship).
147. See Sophie Taylor, Paris Imam Backs France's Burqa Ban, THE
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/7053101/
Paris-imam-backs-Frances-burqa-ban.html (relaying the opinion of a French imam
who criticizes the burqa as a tool of "sexist domination" and argues that when
women cover their faces they cannot share anything with the rest of French
society); cf Ronald P. Sokol, Op-Ed., Veiled Arguments, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/15iht-edsokol.html (quoting
French National Assembly majority leader, Jean-Frangois Cop6, as arguing that the
niqab and burqa prevent women from establishing relationships and participating
in French society because the garments "represent a refusal to exist as a person in
the eyes of others").
148. Cf Choudhury, supra note 136, at 200, 204 (noting that after France
banned headscarves in schools in 2004 on the basis that the headscarf is a symbol
of male oppression, many French Muslim women protested, chanting that they
personally chose to wear the headscarf).
149. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 55 (listing several core
obligations that should be immediately effective, including: guaranteeing non-
discrimination and gender equality; respecting the "right of everyone to identify or
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Article 15(1)(a) at least imposes upon states the obligation to create
an environment where people "can participate in the culture of their
choice."s 0 France's burqa ban deprives Muslim women of the ability
to fully participate in a culture that advocates or encourages women
to wear the burqa, regardless of whether they freely choose to be a
part of that culture.' 5  Therefore, General Comment No. 21
demonstrates that the burqa ban will preclude France from satisfying
even its minimum core obligations as a state party to the ICESCR.152
Furthermore, General Comment No. 21 clarifies when a state party
can limit cultural rights.' Before General Comment No. 21, states
parties were given wide discretion under the ICESCR to determine
when limiting cultural rights would be appropriate; the only
requirements being that the limitation promote the general welfare
and be compatible with the nature of the rights in the ICESCR.15 4
General Comment No. 21, however, requires that any limitation of
the right to take part in cultural life pursue a legitimate aim and be
strictly necessary to promote the general welfare of society.'55
In General Comment No. 21, the CESCR recognizes that some
circumstances require the limitation of cultural rights to protect other
not identify themselves with one or more communities, and the right to change
their choice;" respecting the "right of everyone to engage in their own cultural
practices;" eliminating "barriers or obstacles that inhibit a person's access to the
person's own culture or to other cultures;" and allowing and encouraging the
participation of minority members in the "design and implementation of laws and
policies that affect them", including obtaining their "free and informed prior
consent when the preservation of their cultural resources . . . are at risk").
150. Id.
151. Cf Burqa Ban Passes French Lower House Overwhelmingly, supra note 81
(quoting Amnesty International's expert on discrimination in Europe, John
Dalhuisen, as arguing that a complete ban on the burqa would violate the rights of
"those women who wear the burqa or the niqab in public as an expression of their
identity or beliefs").
152. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 55 (requiring states parties
to at least create an environment that, inter alia, promotes and respects the right of
everyone to identify or not identify themselves with any community or
communities, to "engage in their own cultural practices," and to change the
community or communities with which they choose to identify).
153. See id 17-20 (emphasizing that internationally recognized human rights
trump cultural rights, and thus states can restrict cultural rights that violate
internationally guaranteed human rights).
154. ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 4.
155. General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 1 19.
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human rights.'16 In such cases, General Comment No. 21 only allows
cultural rights to be limited if the limitation is proportionate; the least
restrictive measures are taken; imposition upon other human rights
are considered; cultural backgrounds of those involved are
considered; and the state consults with the individual, group, or
community potentially impacted prior to imposing the limitation. 157
France may try to argue that the burqa ban fulfills its obligation to
protect fundamental rights under General Comment No. 21 because
wearing the burqa violates the gender equality provision of the
ICESCR.'5 8 However, it is unlikely France could successfully argue
that the ban is an acceptable limitation of the right to take part in
cultural life because a complete ban on wearing burqas and niqabs in
public is not the least restrictive measure available to achieve these
goals.15
While undoubtedly the ban will protect the rights of those women
who only wear the burqa in public because they are forced to, the ban
will simultaneously violate the rights of women who freely choose to
wear the burqa in public. 6 0 Alternatively, France could, for example,
impose a partial ban, make agencies more available to Muslim
women in abusive situations, or create laws that specifically target
the men who force women to wear burqas.' 6' Instead, the burqa ban
156. See id (indicating that it may be necessary to limit cultural practices to
protect internationally recognized human rights of people negatively affected by
such cultural practices).
157. Id. IT 18-19, 55.
158. See id. 25 (stating that states are obligated to immediately ensure the
"equal right of men and women to the enjoyment" of the rights granted by the
ICESCR). But see Doland, supra note 83 (noting that in March 2010, France's
highest administrative body stated that the burqa ban could not be legally justified
by concerns for women's equality or human dignity).
159. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 1 19 (requiring limitations to
be proportionate, meaning that states must choose the option that is the least
restrictive when there are multiple ways to achieve the limitation's goal); cf
Doland, supra note 83 (indicating that some politicians do not support a complete
ban, but instead would limit the ban only to certain places, including government
buildings, hospitals, and public transportation).
160. See Doland, supra note 83 (citing an Islamic scholar who said that even
though the burqa ban would not violate Islamic law, it would still violate a Muslim
woman's personal freedom).
161. Cf id. (discussing some French politicians' views that a partial ban should
be implemented and that the government should pursue educational projects
instead of instituting a complete ban on burqas).
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extends beyond providing women forced to wear the burqa with the
freedom to stop wearing it and instead infringes upon the rights of
women who choose to wear the burqa. The ban deprives these
women of the ability to freely engage in a chosen cultural practice
and risks the possibility that, instead of liberating women, the ban
will cause them to withdraw from public life. 16 2 The scope of the
burqa ban is overly broad as it merely replaces one obstacle to the
full realization of cultural rights - men forcing women to wear the
burqa, thereby depriving those women of the ability to fully
participate in French culture - with another - the French government
forcing women not to wear the burqa, thereby depriving those
women of the ability to fully participate in a particular Muslim
culture.163
Finally, by directly discussing violations of Article 15(l)(a),
General Comment No. 21 illustrates that France's burqa ban is, in
fact, a violation of the right to take part in cultural life. To
demonstrate compliance with the obligations of the right to take part
in cultural life, General Comment No. 21 requires that states parties
show that the right is enjoyed without discrimination.164 While
France refuses to acknowledge minority groups based on the
162. See Choudhury, supra note 136, at 204-05 (discussing the concern that, by
forcing Muslim girls to choose between their education and religious beliefs, the
2004 French ban on headscarves in schools would cause the girls to drop out of
school); Man Jailed for Ripping Niqab from Saudi Student in Scotland, SAUDI
GAZETTE, July 27, 2010, http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=
home.regcon&contentlD=2010072779286 (reporting that after a man ripped off a
woman's niqab, exposing her face in public, the woman effectively became house-
bound because she was afraid to go out in public on her own for fear that the
incident might happen again).
163. Compare Elizabeth Farrelly, Op-Ed., Feminists Should See Through a
Garment that Crudely Defines Women, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 23,
2010, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/feminists-should-see-
through-a-garment-that-crudely-defines-women-20100922-15mwa.html (arguing
that the burqa is an obstacle to the exercise of equal rights because it diminishes
the female existence to that of the property of men), with Doland, supra note 83
(noting a complete burqa ban would present an obstacle for women choosing to
wear the burqa to exercise their rights because they wear the burqa not out of
religious obligation, but as a personal freedom).
164. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 60 (demanding that states
show they took "necessary steps towards the full realization of the right to take part




argument that doing so is analogous to discrimination,'65 the CESCR
maintains in General Comment No. 21 that the first step in the
elimination of discrimination is to "recognize the existence of
diverse cultural identities."' 66 The French government interprets its
commitment to equality and secularism as prohibiting the
government from making distinctions based on race, religion, or
origin.'67 Consequently, France does not recognize distinct cultural
identities based on these factors.168
The CESCR is clear in General Comment No. 21, however, that
violations occur when a state party fails to take the necessary
measures to comply with its obligations under the right to take part in
cultural life.169 The inconsistency between the French position -
denying recognition of minority cultures - and the position of the
CESCR in General Comment No. 21 - requiring recognition of
minority cultures - demonstrates that the CESCR will likely
consider France's refusal to recognize the Muslim minority culture
and the right of Muslim women to wear a burqa or niqab as a part of
their cultural life to be a violation of Article 15(l)(a).17 0 In addition, a
ban on burqas prevents access to a cultural practice, which is an
165. See Third Periodic Report, supra note 68, 44 (refusing to recognize
minorities as holders of collective rights because the French Constitution prohibits
distinction among citizens based on origin, race or religion).
166. General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 1 23.
167. See Choudhury, supra note 136, at 236-37 (defining laYcit6 as a uniquely
French concept of state secularism that is enshrined in the French Constitution and
"seeks to generate equality through sameness in the public sphere by relegating
linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or religious differences to the private sphere").
168. Cf Henri Astier, The Deep Roots of French Secularism, BBC NEWS (Sept.
1, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3325285.stm (noting that France
recognizes the individual instead of the group and maintains that "a French citizen
owes allegiance to the nation, and has no officially sanctioned ethnic or religious
identity").
169. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, TT 60, 63 (stating that
violations through omission include the failure to provide appropriate remedies to
enable people to fully exercise their right to take part in cultural life).
170. Compare U.N. Human Rights Comm., Third Periodic Reps. of States
Parties Due in 1992: Addendum (Fr.), 394, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.7 (May
15, 1997) (stating that "[s]ince the basic principles of [France's] public law
prohibit distinctions between citizens on grounds of origin, race or religion, France
is a country in which there are no minorities"), with General Comment No. 21,
supra note 12, 32 (emphasizing that the right to take part in cultural life "entails
the obligation of States parties to recognize . . . minority cultures as an essential
component of the identity of the States themselves").
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example of a violation of Article 15(1)(a) according to General
Comment No. 21.171 While France may have previously been able to
use the ambiguity of the ICESCR to justify its ban on burqas,
General Comment No. 21 clarifies that the ban is a violation of the
right to take part in cultural life granted in Article 15(1)(a) of the
ICESCR.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The clarity provided by General Comment No. 21 does much to
reinforce the importance and legitimacy of the right to take part in
cultural life. Despite this progress, only with a functioning
complaints mechanism can the rights granted by the ICESCR be
fully afforded to individual citizens. By encouraging states to ratify
the Optional Protocol, the CESCR would more quickly assure
citizens of their states' compliance in guaranteeing these rights.
While the progress made as a result of General Comment No. 21 is
substantial, further clarification on the ability of states to limit the
right to take part in cultural life would be useful to alleviate
remaining confusion surrounding when such limitations are
acceptable. Additionally, to further legitimize the gravitas of the
rights granted in the ICESCR, the CESCR should impose specific
repercussions to be faced by states when they violate their citizens'
rights under the ICESCR.
A. THE CESCR SHOULD ENCOURAGE STATES PARTIES TO RATIFY
THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL AND SHOULD EMPHASIZE ITS
IMPORTANCE IN ESTABLISHING THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHTS
RECOGNIZED IN THE ICESCR
While General Comment No. 21 provides immense clarification
on the scope and content of the right to take part in cultural life, a
complaints mechanism for the ICESCR is necessary to truly
legitimize the rights granted in the ICESCR and to demonstrate to
states the appropriate ways to fulfill their obligations under the
ICESCR.1"2 The complaints mechanism created by the Optional
171. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 162.
172. See U.N. Preparatory Comm., World Conference on Human Rights,
Geneva, Apr. 19-30, 1993, Contribution Submitted by the Comm. on Econ., Soc.
& Cultural Rights, Annex I 32-34, 38 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.5
(Mar. 26, 1993) [hereinafter World Conference on Human Rights Submission]
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Protocol will be instrumental in giving legal weight to the right to
take part in cultural life.17 1 With the threat of an international
complaints forum, citizens will be afforded the legal support
necessary to motivate states to better protect their citizens' cultural
rights and to provide more effective domestic legal remedies for
violations.17 4
The CESCR should encourage states parties to ratify the Optional
Protocol and acknowledge the authority of the CESCR to hear
complaints. This mechanism will allow for further development of
economic, social, and cultural rights and will demonstrate the
justiciability of these rights."' Through the use of a complaints
mechanism, the CESCR could begin to encourage the international
community to believe economic, social and cultural rights are equal
to and require the same level of protection as all other human rights.
B. THE CESCR SHOULD AMEND GENERAL COMMENT No. 21 TO
CLARIFY THE ABILITY OF STATES TO LIMIT THE RIGHT TO TAKE
PART IN CULTURAL LIFE
Despite General Comment No. 21's significant guidance for
determining the legality of state limitations on cultural rights,17 6 the
(arguing that a complaints mechanism will provide: a concrete forum for
individuals to seek relief; the development of case law and procedural processes;
further insight into the complex issues that underlie the provisions; and a tangible
outcome, all of which will promote a more widespread and detailed understanding
of the ICESCR).
173. See id. 1 37 (positing that the possibility of an adverse "finding" by the
CESCR would give economic, social, and cultural rights more legal weight
because, while the CESCR's views would not be binding, they would be powerful
legal opinions that the state could not ignore).
174. See id. 35 (suggesting that states prefer to handle claims domestically and
the threat of an international forum encourages states to utilize local remedies).
175. See KITrY ARAMBULO, STRENGTHENING THE SUPERVISION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:
THEORETICAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 176 (1999) (arguing that the Optional
Protocol of the ICCPR demonstrates that a complaints procedure clarifies the legal
substance and scope of specific rights, while providing insight into the overall
justiciability of socio-cultural rights); World Conference on Human Rights
Submission, supra note 172, 33 (noting that a complaints procedure would
produce a result from real conflicts relating to the rights granted by the ICESCR).
176. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, T 19 (limiting the ability of
states parties to restrict cultural rights by requiring that any state-imposed
limitations embody a legitimate purpose, use the least restrictive measures
14732011]
SAM. U. INTLL. REV.
possibility for confusion and inconsistency remains in determining
when a state can limit the right to take part in cultural life. The
CESCR does not provide a standard or test for states to use when
determining whether a cultural practice sufficiently infringes upon
another human right to warrant the restriction of that practice."' The
CESCR should adopt a balancing test that weighs the relative harm
of the cultural practice against its relative value to those who
participate in that practice."
Under such a test, clearly harmful practices, like female genital
mutilation, would be restricted while more contested issues, like the
wearing of burqas, would be carefully weighed, examined, and
determined to cause more harm than provide value before being
restricted by the state.179 To measure the relative harm and value of
each practice, states could examine several factors including:
whether the practice imposes upon individual freedoms, is physically
harmful, is consented to by all parties involved, and whether it
detrimentally affects third parties. Such a test would give states a
concrete formula, minimizing confusion and encouraging the
consistent application of Article 15(1)(a) throughout the international
community.
C. THE CESCR SHOULD AMEND GENERAL COMMENT No. 21 TO
IMPOSE REPERCUSSIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS
GRANTED IN THE ICESCR
General Comment No. 21 increases the understanding of which
actions or inactions might constitute a violation of Article 15(l)(a),
available, and be proportionate to the situation).
177. See id. 11 17-20 (requiring the least restrictive measures to be taken, but
failing to supply a standard to inform states how to balance the interests involved).
178. Cf U.N. Human Rights Comm., Adreld v. Finland, Comm. No. 779/1997,
4.3, 7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (Nov. 7, 2001) (utilizing a test
supplied by the HRC that finds a state action in violation of a community or an
individual's cultural rights when the interference is "so substantial" as to
effectively deny the complainants the right to enjoy their own culture); General
Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 16 (stating that to respect the value that citizens
place on their cultural practices, states must include individuals or communities in
any decision-making process that may impact their cultural rights).
179. See General Comment No. 21, supra note 12, 1 64 (illustrating that failure
to combat practices such as female genital mutilation would constitute a violation
of Article 15(l)(a), thereby suggesting that the proposed balancing test would
coincide with desired results).
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but fails to elaborate on the consequences of such violations.8 0 The
CESCR needs to establish legitimate repercussions for violations of
all the rights granted in the ICESCR.'8 ' Many states incorporated the
provisions of the ICESCR into their domestic legal systems,
providing individuals with the ability to bring claims in domestic
courts. 8 2 Unfortunately, the courts in many of these states refuse to
recognize the authority of the ICESCR,"3 which, when combined
with the lack of an international complaints mechanism, effectively
denies individuals relief for violations of their rights under the
ICESCR.18 4
States will be further motivated to protect cultural rights when the
Optional Protocol goes into effect.' Until then, the CESCR should
amend General Comment No. 21 to impose repercussions upon states
180. See id. 11 60-65, 72 (, leaving the responsibility for imposing consequences
for violations solely to the state domestic system).
181. Cf Audrey R. Chapman, A "Violations Approach" for Monitoring the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q.
23, 23-24 (1996) (arguing that there is a need for a stronger method of monitoring
economic, social, and cultural rights so they will be taken seriously and suggesting
an approach that defines three categories of violations to the ICESCR: violations as
a result of government policies or actions, violations regarding discrimination
patterns, and violations due to a state failing to meet its minimum core
obligations).
182. E.g., 1958 CONsT. art. 55 (Fr.) (stating that under the French Constitution,
ratified treaties or agreements shall prevail over acts of Parliament). But see
Concluding Observations, supra note 67, 13 (expressing concern that despite the
French Constitution's affirmation of the primacy of international law, some French
courts refuse to consider or apply the provisions of the ICESCR and have erected
barriers to judicial remedies for violations of socio-economic and cultural rights).
See generally Chapman, supra note 181, at 46-64 (detailing a list of countries that
ratified or acceded to the ICESCR but categorizing years of specific violations by
these countries).
183. See Chapman, supra note 181, at 49-65 (providing numerous examples of
individual countries' failure to properly implement the ICESCR, including
Sweden, Belgium, Hong Kong, Kenya, Canada, Iran, amongst others).
184. Cf World Conference on Human Rights Submission, supra note 172,
33, 35 (concluding that a complaints procedure for the ICESCR would offer relief
for tangible problems and suggesting that an international complaints forum would
encourage states to ensure that domestic remedies are available so as to preempt
international jurisdiction).
185. See OZDEN WITH NDAGIJMANA, supra note 46, at 14 (articulating the
benefits of adopting an optional protocol, including the development of case law,
the "possibility of lodging a complaint against a violation," and the possibility of
exacting punishment for violations).
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it finds in violation of the ICESCR through the state reporting
procedure instead of merely issuing recommendations to the
violating state.'16 The CESCR should make violations more visible to
the public and should disseminate information to international
organizations and non-governmental organizations to place added
pressure on these states to correct the violation.' The CESCR needs
to, at the very least, hold states accountable for violations by
ensuring that their reputations are at risk for violating the rights
recognized in the ICESCR.
CONCLUSION
The right to take part in cultural life is filled with complexity.
France originally responded to this complexity by determining its
own definition for the right, which was based on its ideals of
secularism and its emphasis on a singular cultural identity. The ban
on burqas and niqabs coincides with France's definition; however,
the clarity provided by General Comment No. 21 rejects France's
interpretation, and instead imposes a definition that encompasses the
rights of minorities to take part in their own culture. Consequently,
France's ban on burqas no longer fits within the internationally
understood definition of the right to take part in cultural life. General
Comment No. 21 makes violations of the right to take part in cultural
life more easily identifiable, and therefore, the right may be better
protected.
186. See Chapman, supra note 181, at 27-29 (arguing that the failure of a
majority of the states parties to the ICESCR to even comply with the reporting
requirements demonstrates that the international community fails to exhibit the
political will or capability to effectively monitor economic, social, and cultural
rights).
187. Cf Art Blaser, Assessing Human Rights: The NGO Contribution, in
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO
STRATEGIES 261, 262 (Ved P. Nanda, James R. Scarritt & George W. Shepherd, Jr.
eds., 1981) (discussing how NGOs play an important role in monitoring human
rights violations because they do not wait for the development of implementation
procedures, are independent of political forces, and are therefore able to "identify
and criticize human rights violations wherever they may occur").
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